Governing the commons

Governing the commons : the evolution of institutions for collective action
Ostrom, Elinor
1990
Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press.   xxviii, 280 p.
Resumen: Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved.
Dr. Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions.
She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions.
In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways--both successful and unsuccessful--of governing the commons.
In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organizations rather than by a coercive state.
Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
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